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THE ERASURE OF ISLAMIC DIFFERENCE
IN CANADIAN AND AMERICAN FAMILY
LAW ADJUDICATION
Pascale Fournier*
In Canada, I don’t think we’ve really explored how
immigration experience changes people, when they move
from one country to another. It’s easier just to comment
on different foods and folkloric dances than to really
understand what people go through when they
emigrate. . . . In Canada, there has been a tendency to
trivialize.1
INTRODUCTION
Canada and the United States are multicultural societies in
which cultural differences abound. Yet their dominant cultures
often control these differences by assimilating them into
*LL.B., Université Laval; LL.M., University of Toronto; LL.M.,
Harvard (expected 2002). I would like above all to thank Brenda Cossman of
the University of Toronto for her magnificent mentorship. I am also especially
grateful to Ann Laquer Estin of the University of Iowa for valuable comments
and to Marie-Claire Belleau of l’Université Laval and Janet Halley of Harvard
for always encouraging my critical spirit. The Journal of Law and Policy’s
Editorial Board, particularly Caroline Nadal, Audrey Woo and Angela
Calcagno, did superb work under difficult circumstances.
I acknowledge with gratitude the support of the Fonds pour la Formation
de Chercheurs et l’Aide à la Recherche (“FCAR”), the University of Toronto,
the Canada-U.S. Fulbright Program, the American Association of University
Women, and the Harvard Law School Islamic Legal Studies Program.
1
Nino Ricci, Profiles, quoted in NEIL BISSOONDATH, SELLING
ILLUSIONS: THE CULT OF MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA 78 (Penguin Books
1994).
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mainstream norms. This tendency manifests itself in family law
when judges, while administering complex but vague legal
notions, apply their own perspectives to individuals who belong
to culturally-defined minority communities. When courts define
“the Other”2 by its differences from majoritarian values and
overlook the experiences of “different” people themselves, they
rely on and reproduce cultural stereotypes. In this article, I
expose judicial marginalization of cultural differences in family
law decisions addressing features of Islamic marriage.
One must view differences as relational rather than intrinsic.
They are inventions, not discoveries. Nitya Iyer notes that
“difference is necessarily a comparative concept. It does not
inhere in people or things; it expresses a relationship. A thing
cannot be different in isolation.”3 As adjudicators, judges
determine who is different and who is normal. In so doing, they
impose unstated norms against which difference is classified.
Martha Minow explains the source of these benchmarks:
“Unstated points of reference may express the experience of a
majority or may express the perspective of those who have had
greater access to the power used in naming and assessing
others.”4 Judicially-administered normalcy, however, subjects
2

I am transposing this term into domestic legal contexts from its classic
use by Edward Said to describe “the binary typology of advanced and
backward (or subject) races, cultures, and societies.” EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM 206 (Vintage Books 1978).
3
Nitya Iyer, Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of
Social Identity, 19 QUEEN’S L.J. 179, 182 (1993) (emphasis added).
4
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 51 (Cornell University Press 1990).
Professor Minow adds the following observation:
“Different” traits are regarded as intrinsic to the “different” person,
and the norm used to identify difference is assumed to be obvious,
needing neither statement nor exposure to challenge. Differences are
presumed identified through an unsituated perspective that makes
other perspectives irrelevant and sees prevailing social arrangements
as natural, good, and uncoerced. The chief effect of these
assumptions is to deposit the problem of difference on the person
identified by the others as different. Screened out by these
assumptions are the possibilities that difference expresses patterns of
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minority cultures to unfavorable comparisons with mainstream
society, as it is defined by the courts. Jurists need to dislocate
and displace themselves from such traditional frameworks of
legal analysis. Only then can they reconceptualize the legal
stories told in their courtrooms and thus achieve more nuanced
constructions of cultural minority identities.5
This article chronicles Canadian and American courts’
ignorance of Muslim people’s cultures. I explore the judicial
discretion to name or refuse to name “Others.” Case law
demonstrates that judges frequently perceive Muslim cultural
differences as too drastic to fit within existing legal categories.
Embedded in these family law decisions are assumptions about
what constitutes “proper” conduct, values, and practices, that is
who we are and, by way of opposition, who they are. Unstated
norms prevail, norms that contribute to the process of
racialization.6
In Part I, I examine a 1998 Ontario decision, Kaddoura v.
Hammoud,7 which renders the particular experiences and
perspectives of Muslim people invisible at the same time as it
marks them as the Other. In that case the court refused to require
payment of the Mahr,8 a Muslim marriage custom, because the
contract had a religious purpose and thus could not be enforced.9
I compare this Canadian decision with several American cases
relationships, social perceptions, and the design of institutions made
by some without others in mind.
Id. at 79.
5
See Angela P. Harris, Forward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction,
82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 744 (1994). The author argues for a conception of the
subject as multiplicitous and contingent, one that can be developed by
disrupting the unity and certainty of modern categories and paradigms. Id.
6
See generally John A. Powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to
Interrogate Racial Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 429 (2000) (elaborating
on how an “unstated norm through most of our history has been the norm of
Whiteness and maleness.”)
7
[1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
8
The Mahr is a gift from a husband to his wife. It is not a price paid for
an Islamic marriage, but rather an effect of the contract.
9
See infra notes 19-46 and accompanying text (providing further
discussion of this decision).
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involving the Mahr to assess the implications for multicultural
societies of different models of judicial attention to culture in
family law.
In Part II, I discuss another Islamic religious practice that has
posed a challenge to Canadian family law, namely the muta,10 a
temporary institution of marriage found in the Shia Muslim
tradition. In Y.J. v. N.J.,11 a 1994 child custody dispute over a
five-year-old girl born in the context of polygamy, an Ontario
court imposed “traditional” notions of the family instead of
recognizing the implications of the muta. I explicate the dangers
inherent in applying majoritarian social norms to a cultural
minority’s different traditions. More specifically, I analyze the
case’s legal interpretations of notions such as “best interests of
the child” and “harm” in light of dominant cultural constructs
about what is a family in Canadian society. Again, I will
compare American case law and propose an improved method of
adjudication.
The mode of analysis employed in the Mahr and muta cases
constructs and reifies the Muslim identity that is prevalent in
Canadian and American courtrooms. It is a product of
Orientalism,12 a geopolitical mindset that has long conceived a
10

In the Shia sect of Islam, muta is a temporary marriage that is initiated
by a man. It lasts for a specific period of time and includes a specific amount
of money or property given to the woman. See Sachiko Murata, Temporary
Marriage in Islamic Law, available at http://www.al-islam.org/al-serat/muta
(last visited Nov. 30, 2001).
11
(1994) O.J. No. 2359. See infra Part II (providing a discussion of the
court’s treatment of the muta tradition).
12
For a more in-depth definition of Orientalism as a discourse and a
system of knowledge and power, see SAID, supra note 2, at 41:
Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly, and in
some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive
together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in
various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behaviour of
Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an
atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and
even see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular
characteristics. But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions
influenced the people who were called Orientals as well as those
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wide gap between the West and the Orient, the latter
characterized by its “sensuality, tendency to despotism, aberrant
mentality, habits of inaccuracy, [and] backwardness.”13 Orientals
live in that world, while Westerners live in one that is
industrialized, rational, progressive, and fair.14 This division
expresses a hostility and lack of similarity between the colonial
binaries of Us and Them, here and there, West and non-West,
colonizer and colonized.15 While mainstream society speaks,
called Occidentals, European or Western. . . . If the essence of
Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western
supremacy and Oriental inferiority, then we must be prepared to note
how in its development and subsequent history Orientalism deepened
and even hardened the distinction.
SAID, supra note 2, at 41.
13
SAID, supra note 2, at 205.
14
See Uma Narayan, Essence of Culture and a Sense of History: A
Feminist Critique of Cultural Essentialism, 13 HYPATIA 2, 4 (1998). The
author focuses on Western accounts of other cultures as contingent fictions in
arguing the following:
The frequently reiterated contrast between “Western” and “NonWestern” cultures was a politically motivated colonial construction.
The self-proclaimed “superiority” of “Western culture” had,
however, only a faint resemblance to the moral, political, and cultural
values that actually pervaded life in Western societies. Thus liberty
and equality could be represented as paradigmatic “Western values,”
hallmarks of its civilizational superiority, at the very moment when
Western nations were engaged in slavery, colonization, expropriation,
and the denial of liberty and equality not only to the colonized but to
large segments of Western subjects, including women. Profound
similarities between Western culture and many of its Others, such as
hierarchical social systems, huge economic disparities between
members, and the mistreatment and inequality of women, were
systematically ignored in this construction of “Western culture.”
Id.
15
See SAID, supra note 2, at 45. Professor Said makes the following
observation:
When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the
starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy, the
result is usually to polarize the distinction—the Oriental becomes
more Oriental, the Westerner more Western—and limit the human
encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. In

FOURNIERMAC1-22.DOC

56

2/21/02 7:41 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

writes, and reifies Oriental cultural identity, the subject of
attention, the “Oriental” man or woman created, is viewed and
judged as the exotic Other.
This identity imposition fails because the Other, who appears
in and exists through her difference, who is the object and
fascination of the West, can hardly be reduced to something
recognizable or familiar to the observer’s eyes. As a result, the
“logic of identity” denies or represses difference. As Iris Marion
Young argues, “reducing the heterogeneity of sensuous
particulars to the unity of thought” leads to “a relentless logic of
identity [that] seeks to reduce the plurality of particular subjects,
their bodily, perspectival experience, to a unity, by measuring
them against the unvarying standard of universal reason.”16
Ironically, by attempting to contain differences within a unified
rubric, courts turn the different subject into the absolute Other.
Universalism collapses into dualism.
The decisions I analyze in this article promote a judicial ideal
of impartiality and universality by treating each person as an
unencumbered individual, ignoring religion and culture as
constitutive traits. Muslim women become monumentalized
objects, frozen and fixed eternally through the colonial gaze17 of
short, from its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a
form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the
altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hardand-fast distinctions as “East” and “West”: to channel thought into a
West or an East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the
center of Orientalist theory, practice, and values found in the West,
the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as
having the status of scientific truth.
SAID, supra note 2, at 45. Western thought has produced many mutually
exclusive oppositions: subject/object, mind/body, good/bad, pure/impure. The
first side of this dichotomy, considered the unified and the self-identical, is
elevated over the second, which designates the chaotic and the unformed. See
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 99
(Princeton University Press 1990).
16
Young, supra note 15, at 99.
17
I borrow this term from Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on
Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 525, 525 (1997).
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judges without any account of their own perspective of what it
means to be Muslim, “Oriental,” and different. These female
litigants’ personhood disappears during the majoritarian legal
decision-making process. In denying their claims, judges display
an impoverished understanding of what culture and religion are,
how they differ, and why they matter.
I. KADDOURA V. HAMMOUD AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF ISLAMIC
MARRIAGE CONTRACTS: DANGEROUS CROSSING!
“Dangerous Crossing”; it’s painted on signboards all
over the world!18
A. The Canadian Religious Thicket
In Kaddoura v. Hammoud,19 religion played a pivotal role in
the Ontario Court of Justice’s decision not to enforce the
obligation to pay a Mahr, an amount of $30,000 due to the wife
under an Islamic marriage contract. In so holding, the court
participated in a cultural encounter,20 but found that people from
minority groups should resolve their religious conflicts among
themselves and with the advice of their God, not our judicial
system.
This case is the story of Sam and Manira.21 They were
18

See WILLA CATHER, THE PROFESSOR’S HOUSE 247 (Knopf 1925),
available at http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/p/pd-modeng/pd-modeng-idx?type
=header&byte=8337423.
19
[1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
20
Following release of his judgment, Judge Rutherford acknowledged the
significance of the case for the Muslim community. In Kaddoura v.
Hammoud, (1999) O.J. No. 172, a judgment concerning costs, he stated:
The issue of the Mahr obligation was an interesting one and said by
counsel on both sides to be of importance broadly within the Muslim
communities in this country. I would estimate that about 75% of the
trial itself related to the issue. It was an important issue to litigate,
going beyond the interests of the parties themselves.
Id.
21
Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
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nineteen and twenty years old respectively when they became
engaged.22 They had been dating, secretly, because this is not
permitted for young Muslim men and women.23 At the wedding,
Sam, Manira and their official witnesses signed both the
documents necessary pursuant to the province of Ontario’s
requirements24 and a Muslim marriage certificate, written in
Arabic.25 The parties were married only eighteen months. Their
relationship was stormy, and Manira moved back to her parents’
home several times.26 Shortly after the last incident, Sam served
her with a divorce petition. Judgment for divorce was granted.27
In Manira’s counter-petition, she sought damages of $30,000 to
which she claimed she was entitled as payment of the Mahr.28
Sam had paid $5,000 before the marriage and deferred payment
of an additional $30,000.29 In his testimony, Sam said he knew
that $30,000 was the amount of the deferred portion of the Mahr,
but he said he never understood that he would be compelled to
pay it.30 Sam testified that his sister had divorced and that she
was unable to collect the deferred portion of the Mahr that was
due to her.31
According to Section 52(1) of Ontario’s Family Law Act, a
man and a woman who are married to each other or intend to
marry may enter into an agreement on their respective rights and
obligations during the marriage or on separation.32 For an
agreement to be enforced, the first issue to be determined by a
court is whether there is an agreement of a binding nature
22

Id. at ¶ 11.
Id.
24
Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F-3 § 28(1) (2) (1990) (Can.).
25
Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶ 18.
26
Id. at ¶¶ 1-5.
27
Id. at ¶ 6.
28
Id.
29
Id. at ¶15.
30
Id. at ¶ 16.
31
Id.
32
Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F-3 (1990), amended by ch. 32, § 12,
1992 S.O.; ch. 27, sched., 1993 S.O.; ch. 25, sched. E, § 1, 1997 S.O.; ch.
26, § 102 1997 S.O.; ch. 6, § 25, 1999 S.O (Can.).
23
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between the parties. A court will consider whether they freely
and willingly entered into the agreement.33 In Kaddoura v.
Hammoud, both Sam and Manira acknowledged the agreement as
to the Mahr.34 Further, no evidence showed that the provision
requiring the payment of $30,000 was vague or that the
agreement was signed under circumstances suggestive of
inequality, improvidence, or duress. Despite the obligatory
nature of the Mahr under Islamic principles, however, the judge
held that the agreement was not enforceable by Canadian courts.
In resolving the issue, the judge considered cultural evidence
in order to define the content of Muslim marriages solemnized in
Canada.35 Two experts, the imam of a mosque36 in Ottawa, and
the director of the Institute of Islamic Learning in Ajax, Ontario,
also an imam and scholar of Islam, expounded in their testimony
on the nature of the Mahr.37 According to evidence relied upon
by the court, the Mahr consists of “a gift or contribution made by
the husband-to-be to his wife-to-be, for her exclusive property. It
is not, however, a gift in the sense that a gift is given by the
grace of the giver, but in fact ‘Mahr’ is obligatory and the wifeto-be receives it as of right.”38 David Pearl and Werner Menski,
in Muslim Family Law, confirm that the Mahr is a right of the
wife: “More commonly some of the dower (Mahr), if not the
entire amount, will be deferred. It is then payable on the
dissolution of the marriage by divorce or death, or on the
happening of a specified event.”39 Pearl and Menski agree that

33

See generally Belanger v. Belanger, (1995) O.J. No. 1195; Griffioen v.
Bickley (1993) O.J. No. 3027.
34
Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶¶ 16, 20.
35
Id. at ¶14.
36
The “imam” is the leader of congregational prayer performed in the
mosque. See generally Encyclopaedia of the Orient, at http://www.lexicorient.
com/e.o/index.htm. Any Muslim trained in the prayer can be the imam. Id. In
general, the honor is given to the most respected person in the assembly. Id.
In modern times, mosques have elevated the imam into an employed leader,
religious adviser and spokesperson for the congregation. Id.
37
Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶ 14.
38
Id. at ¶13 (emphasis added).
39
DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 180
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only in two situations will the wife lose her entitlement to the
Mahr—”[f]irst, if the marriage is dissolved by the husband before
consummation, in various situations akin to annulment [and,]
[s]econdly, if the marriage is dissolved by an action of the wife
before consummation. . . .”40
Instead of considering this context, however, the court kept
its distance from any doctrinal investigation of the Mahr:
Both experts said that while Mahr was in the nature of a
right held by a Muslim wife, she could, by certain
conduct or in certain circumstances, disentitle herself to
it. While Dr. Gamal was less emphatic on the point than
was Mufti Khan, the latter advised that any dispute over
the obligation of the Mahr was a matter to be determined
by religious authorities. In any event, both experts agreed
that any such dispute was to be resolved according to
Islamic religious principles.41
At the same time, the Ontario Court of Justice specifically
found the Mahr to be obligatory, that it is a right granted to the
wife and a component of Islamic marriage. On the evidence put
before it, the court was satisfied that the agreement was freely
made. The judge’s reasoning reveals that it is the religious
dimension of the Mahr that rendered the agreement
unenforceable:
While not, perhaps, an ideal comparison, I cannot help
but think that the obligation of the Mahr is as unsuitable
for adjudication in the civil courts as is an obligation in a
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998). Jamal J. Nasir, in his book THE ISLAMIC
LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 98 (London: Graham & Trotman, 1990), is of the
same opinion.
40
Pearl & Menski, supra note 39, at 180. I note in addition that a khul
divorce is one in which a wife sues for divorce even though the husband has
not misbehaved. If a wife simply wishes to end the marriage, the husband may
agree to grant her the divorce if she returns all or part of the Mahr. See
Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract in American Courts, Paper
presented to the Minaret of Freedom Banquet (May 20, 2000), available at
http://www.minaret.org/azizah.htm [hereinafter al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage
Contract].
41
Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶14.
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Christian religious marriage, such as to love, honour and
cherish, or to remain faithful, or to maintain the marriage
in sickness or other adversity so long as both parties live,
or to raise children according to specified religious
doctrine. Many such promises go well beyond the basic
legal commitment to marriage required by our civil law,
and are essentially matters of chosen religion and
morality. They are derived from and are dependent upon
doctrine and faith. They bind the conscience as a matter
of religious principle but not necessarily as a matter of
enforceable civil law.42
Tellingly, and erroneously, the judge imports a Christian,
majoritarian comparison with the Islamic institution of the Mahr.
He overlooks the fact that, whereas Christian vows constitute
moral obligations that are indefinite insofar as they can only bind
the conscience, the Mahr is a financial obligation. The court’s
message is that a valid agreement between two Muslim parties is
unenforceable, not for vagueness like the Christian examples
deemed analogous, but because of the agreement’s religious
purpose.
Closer scrutiny demonstrates that the “morality” objection is
of scant substance. Exclusion of Muslim marriage contracts from
the scope of judicial power is, according to the subtext of the
decision, based on apparent cultural anxiety. The judge felt that
he had no authority, as a non-Islamic adjudicator, to speak or
write about the Other:
I don’t think, even if I had received clear and complete
Islamic doctrine from these experts, that I could, as if
applying foreign law, apply such religious doctrine to a
civil resolution of this dispute. . . . Mufti Khan in
particular, said that only an Islamic religious authority
could resolve such a dispute.43
Moreover, the court feared that venturing down a path of
religious doctrine would involve untold dangers:

42
43

Id. at ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶¶ 27, 28.
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In my view, to determine what the rights and obligations
of Sam and Manira are in relation to the undertaking of
Mahr in their Islamic marriage ceremony would
necessarily lead the Court into the “religious thicket,” a
place that the courts cannot safely and should not go.44
By holding a valid agreement made between Muslim people
unenforceable because it is based on Islamic rules, the court
valued and enforced homogeneity. Some people are allowed to
participate in the construction of Canadian identity; some are not.
Some cultures’ institutions are identified with universality; some
are not. Iris Marion Young has powerfully argued this point:
The dominant group reinforces its position by bringing the
other groups under the measure of the dominant
norms. . . . Since only the dominant group’s cultural
expressions receive wide dissemination, their [sic] cultural
expressions become the normal, or the universal, and
thereby the unremarkable. Given the normality of its own
cultural expressions and identity, the dominant group
constructs the differences which some groups exhibit as
lack and negation.45
In the colonial gaze of the court, Manira sees a reflection of
herself as a Muslim woman who is limited to beseeching her own
people for recognition. The distinctive character of the Muslim
community is threatening to the court. The judge refused to
endorse difference, for to do so would lead him into the
“religious thicket” where majoritarian norms are unknown and
without currency, where familiar rules do not function as usual,
and where law has to step outside its comfortable doctrinal
reference points. Not safe, said the court; therefore, not good and
not enforceable. By abstaining from the use of its powers to
compel enforcement in this case, the court compels minorities to
conform to the power structure of the culturally-privileged
majority. The norm is vindicated.
Had Manira and Sam made the same agreement in the
absence of the disturbing Muslim ethos, the court would likely
44
45

Id. at ¶ 28 (emphasis added).
Young, supra note 15, at 59.
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have confirmed the will of the parties. Indeed, in his judgment
for costs of the action, Judge Rutherford acknowledged the
unfairness of such legal reasoning, that is his legal reasoning:
While I drew a boundary between a debt enforceable in
civil law and the obligation of the Mahr, it nonetheless
seems to me somewhat offensive and dishonourable on the
part of Mr. Kaddoura, to knowingly participate in the
wedding customs and practices of his Muslim community,
including the Mahr which he clearly knew included a
“written” or deferred amount of $30,000, and then
eschew those customs and practices when they worked to
his financial detriment.46
These equities, however, did not affect the legal outcome; thus,
in Canada payment of the Mahr lacks backing from the courts.
B. Gazing Across the Border: The American Experience with
the Mahr
The judge in Kaddoura v. Hammoud treated the legal
question of enforcing the Mahr as one of first impression. Had he
looked at American case law, however, precedents would have
presented themselves. Indeed, one trial court decision in New
York reached the opposite result in precisely the same
circumstances, using an identical universalist approach. In Aziz v.
Aziz, a 1985 decision, the Supreme Court of New York held that
“[t]he document at issue conforms to the requirements of the
General Obligations Law . . . and its secular terms are
enforceable as a contractual obligation, notwithstanding that it
was entered into as part of a religious ceremony.”47 Although the
Mahr debt was paid to the Muslim wife in this case, by using the
word “conforms” the court failed to be culturally sensitive. It
asked from a majoritarian perspective whether the Islamic
46

Kaddoura, (1999) O.J. No. 172, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added) (regarding
costs, $1,500 was awarded to Sam).
47
488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); see also N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(3) (requiring that agreements in consideration of
marriage be made in writing).
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marriage contract fit into a legal category. The judge made no
attempt to gain an internal appreciation of the role of the Mahr in
a Muslim couple’s wedding and subsequent relationship.
Interestingly, the judgment in Aziz was based on a 1983 decision
of the Court of Appeals, the highest state court of New York,
concerning a Jewish marriage contract, or ketubah.48 In this case,
Avitzur v. Avitzur, four of seven judges applied what they called
“neutral principles of contract law”49 to avoid the religious
thicket feared by the three dissenters, who refused to engage
questions that, in their view, implicated “Jewish religious law
and tradition.”50
The insular perspective of the New York courts can just as
easily lead to a different conclusion, as was the case in 1988
when a California appellate court decided In re Marriage of
Dajani.51 This decision attempted to fit the Mahr into the legal
category of prenuptial agreements and found those that “facilitate
divorce or separation by providing for a settlement only in the
event of such an occurrence . . . void as against public policy.”52
Whereas the classification approach used by the Kaddoura
and Aziz courts to refer to a Muslim practice using North
American legal categories was fundamentally universalist, other
courts have demonstrated a strong cultural relativist tendency.
This relativist method is based on the idea that there is a single
truth to be found in Islamic law; the approach mirrors the
universalists’ quest for absolute verities in Western legal
doctrine. For instance, the trial judge in Dajani heard expert
testimony and, in finding against the woman’s claim, held that
“the law in existence would be that of the Jordanian or Moslem
law, and . . . if the wife initiates a termination of the
48

Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 124. It is noteworthy that the California case
that I discuss next, In re Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988),
also drew on a precedent addressing a ketubah dispute. See In re Marriage of
Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
49
58 N.Y.2d 108, 115 (1983) (emphasis added).
50
Id. at 119.
51
251 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
52
Id. at 872 (quoting In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 295
(Cal. 1973)).
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relationship, she forgoes the dowry and common sense and
wisdom of Mohamed would dictate that she forgo the dowry.”53
Another example of a court adopting the relativist approach
can be found in Akileh v. Elchahal, a Florida case in which the
judge, as noted on appeal, found that the sadaq (equivalent to a
Mahr) “was meant to protect the wife from an unwanted divorce.
As such, the trial court would not order the husband to pay the
wife the postponed sadaq since the wife was ‘the one who chose
to pursue the divorce.’”54 This line of reasoning comports with
the khul form of divorce, in which “the wife tells the husband ‘I
want to leave you; take your mahr and go.’”55 But the judge
ignored the principle of darar (meaning cruelty or harm):
There is an exception to the rule; a woman can seek
judicial divorce for harm . . . without losing her delayed
mahr. The husband need not physically torture her; under
Jordanian law, under Kuwaiti law, just verbal abuse is
sufficient. . . . In this case the husband transmitted
venereal disease to the woman, and therefore the harm
was clearly established.56
Even though the Florida Court of Appeal reversed the trial
judgment awarding the female claimant $50,000, the court’s
reasoning contained a misleading blend of universalism and
cultural relativism. Ostensibly relying on Aziz and neutral
contract law principles (but omitting the fact that in Aziz the wife
was awarded a divorce decree based on constructive
abandonment), the court nonetheless strayed from the universalist
course and ventured into the interpretation of Islamic law. It was
presented with the following contradictory evidence:
At trial four witnesses testified as to the meaning of the
Islamic [sic] word “sadaq.” The wife’s Islamic expert,
Mazi Najjar, testified that generally a sadaq is similar to
the concept of a dowry. He stated that only the wife could
waive her right to receive the postponed portion of the
53
54
55
56

Id.
666 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
See al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 20.
Al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 14.

FOURNIERMAC1-22.DOC

66

2/21/02 7:41 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

sadaq. Najjar said that the wife’s right to receive the
sadaq was not negated if the wife filed for divorce.
The wife testified that a wife’s right to receive the
postponed portion of the sadaq was absolute and not
affected by the cause of a divorce. The wife stated that the
exception was that a wife would forfeit the dowry if she
cheated on her husband. The wife was unaware of any
other instances in which the sadaq would be forfeited.
Raju Akileh, the wife’s father, also testified that the
postponed portion of the sadaq is an absolute right of a
wife to request from the husband whenever she wished
and especially in the event of divorce.
The husband testified that he believed the postponed
portion of the sadaq was forfeited if the wife chose to
divorce her husband. The husband’s understanding of the
sadaq stemmed from his sister’s experience. His sister
had previously sought a divorce and then pursued the
postponed sadaq. An Islamic court ruled that she was not
entitled to receive the sadaq since she had wanted the
divorce. However, the husband testified that a woman
seeking a divorce is entitled to her sadaq if she is abused.
The husband admitted that he had never discussed the
meaning of sadaq with the wife or her father.57
The court, while basing its decision on principles of contract
law, showed a disposition to believe the testimony of Ms.
Akileh’s side, stating that “[a]t no time did the husband make
known his unique understanding of a sadaq either during his
negotiations with the wife’s father or prior to signing the
certificate of marriage.”58 Ironically, even the husband’s
definition contained the very principle of darar that could have
decided the case against him.
The various incompatible interpretations of the sadaq in this
57

Akileh, 666 So. 2d at 247-48 (emphasis added). I note a parallel to
Kaddoura, where Sam testified that his sister had been divorced and was
unable to collect the deferred portion of the Mahr that was due to her. See
Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶16.
58
Akileh, 666 So. 2d at 249 (emphasis added).
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Florida dispute demonstrate the dangers involved when courts
attempt to establish conclusive tenets of Islamic law. Regarding a
case in Virginia, Azizah al-Hibri of the University of Richmond
School of Law reported that:
On one occasion a well-known Islamic scholar said to me,
“Mahr is the bride price.” This is abhorrent. It is my
suspicion that it is such testimony that [a Virginia judge]
heard in his court that led him to say “slavery is over in
the U.S., if Islamic marriage law says women are sold
into marriage, then we will not enforce it in this
country.”59
Professor al-Hibri is wary of expert testimony, which was also
present in the Ontario judgment in Kaddoura:
Many Muslim men, whether imams of mosques or
professors of religion, are not sufficiently familiar with
Islamic law. Often, they confuse their cultural beliefs and
practices with Islam itself. An American judge has no
way of discerning the difference in the absence of more
reliable sources of information. If I am a non-Muslim
American judge and a Muslim expert witness, a Muslim
professor of Islam (how more reliable can an expert
witness be?) or the imam of a masjid [mosque] walks into
my court, then I am inclined to believe that I am going to
get the real story. But that is not always the case.60
A California court recently added the following caution:
[E]ven the term “Islamic law” is relatively uncertain.
There are at least four schools of interpretation of Islamic
law: the Shafi’i, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali. . . . The
legal system in various Islamic countries will often be
influenced by one school or the other. . . . Egypt, for
example, has been influenced by both the Hanafi and
Maliki schools. . . . Indeed, one commentator has
observed that England has rejected any attempt to give
effect to Islamic “personal law” because of the varieties

59
60

Al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 17.
Al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 17.
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of competing schools within Islam.61
The monolithic vision of Islamic law that most judges reveal is
part of the Orientalist fallacy. As Edward Said has aptly stated:
“‘We’ are this, ‘they’ are that. Which Arab, which Islam, when,
how, according to what test: these appear to be irrelevant
distinctions.”62
Both universalist and cultural relativist approaches engage in
an overly narrow exercise of the judicial role. The universalist
makes no effort to go beyond the familiar legal categories of
contract or divorce law. The cultural relativist abdicates the
responsibility of arbitrating legal disputes, substituting the
opinion of a male imam or a probably male professor. Irony lies
in relativism’s application of a single perspective, which is
elevated uncritically and given universal application. Dianne Otto
has appositely described a dual task to expose “the cultural
allegiances and imperialist potential of the universalist
arguments, [and to bring] to light the narrowness of the diversity
promoted by the cultural relativist position.”63
I propose a third method, what I call the functional approach
to minority cultures’ interactions with the majoritarian legal
system. This approach aims to transcend the impasse between
universalism and cultural relativism, a struggle that can
disempower those who are intersectionally marginalized in both
hierarchies:
In turning away from the discourse and images of self as
the stereotyped Muslim woman, individual women turn
toward either the colonizer/West or Islam for affirmation.
Instead of affirmation, however, they find devaluations
and apprehension in the former (Orientalism) and
mechanisms for their control in the latter (Islamism).64

61

In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 869 n.4 (2001). I am
much obliged to Ann Laquer Estin for pointing out this case.
62
SAID, supra note 2, at 237.
63
Dianne Otto, Rethinking the Universality of Human Rights Law, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 38 (1997).
64
SHAHNAZ KHAN, MUSLIM WOMEN: CRAFTING A NORTH AMERICAN
IDENTITY 3 (University Press of Florida 2000). For a discussion of “the
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Functionalism has its origins in legal anthropology,
particularly in the work of Bronislaw Malinowski.65 As described
by Annelise Riles:
Malinowski’s empiricism, defined in opposition to what
Malinowski saw as an earlier generation’s conjecture
about historical evolutionary processes, emphasized a kind
of relational reasoning: “The explanations here given
consisted in an analysis of certain facts into simpler
elements and of tracing the relations between these
elements.” The subject matter of Malinowski’s discovery,
then, was the cultural context of law rather than a set of
rules. . . .66
In the spirit of the functional approach, we should encourage
cultural repositioning and enlightened engagement in courtrooms.
After they find threshold conformity to legally recognized
contractual forms (the absence of problems such as vagueness
and duress), judges confronted with the issue of Mahr
enforcement should address the central question of the Mahr’s
role in a Muslim marriage. This involves a more complex inquiry
than simply asking what the result of a dispute would be under
Islamic law.67
Functionalist judges should take notice of social context and
cultural diversity, “realiz[ing] that they can only discharge their
democratic responsibilities to a nation that is culturally rich and

paradox of multicultural vulnerability” describing the effect of law on
intragroup power relations for groups such as Muslim women, see Ayelet
Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of
Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 386 (2000).
65
See generally ADAM KUPER, ANTHROPOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGISTS:
THE MODERN BRITISH SCHOOL 1-35 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983) (devoting
a chapter to the works of Malinowski).
66
Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the
Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597, 603 (1994) (quoting
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 127-28
(1926)).
67
We have seen the fallacy of a unitary concept of Islamic law due to the
fact that different Islamic countries follow distinct interpretations of legal
issues such as Mahr payment. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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ideologically diverse by demonstrating that they have considered
a full range of perspectives and resources in arriving at their
results.”68 This mode of dispute resolution is an extremely
promising candidate to be a guiding principle for adjudication in
multicultural societies. Professor Riles notes the following:
The legal text, rule, or decision . . . cannot be understood
without considering the totality of cultural factors that
give it meaning. . . . “The various official discourses of
law deal primarily with rules whose application
transcends, at least in theory, differences in personal and
social status. In striking contrast to this focus on legal
rules, lay litigants speak often about personal values,
social relations, and broad conceptions of fairness and
equity in seeking resolution of their difficulties through
legal channels.”69
Functionalism prevents the privileging of legal form over cultural
context.
A judge could look behind the religious nature of the Mahr to
ask what its purpose is in a marriage, and what values, such as
68

Shalin M. Sugunasiri, Contextualism: The Supreme Court’s New
Standard of Judicial Analysis and Accountability, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 126,
174 (1999).
69
Riles, supra note 66, at 636 (quoting JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M.
O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL
DISCOURSE 1 (1990)); see also Charles R. Lawrence, The Word and the River:
Pedagogy as Scholarship and Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2278-79
(1992):
Litigation is highly formalized storytelling. . . . But the law’s
tradition of storytelling is very different from the African tradition.
Where our tradition values rich contextual detail, the law excludes
large parts of the story as irrelevant. Where we seek to convey the
full range and depth of feeling, the law asks us to disregard emotions.
Where we celebrate the specific and the personal, the law tells stories
about disembodied “reasonable men.” . . . We remain invisible and
unheard in the literature that is the evidentiary database for legal
discourse, and when we are seen, in stories told by others, our
images are severely distorted by the lenses of fear, bias, and
misunderstanding.
Id.
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trust, respect, and financial independence are promoted by its
enforcement.70 This would shed considerable light on the question
of enforceability as a matter of public policy. Islamic law experts
could be helpful in describing the institution and its traditions,
but the voice of the Muslim woman would become indispensable,
rather than silenced. Only she can contextualize the role of the
Mahr from a female perspective and make vivid the benefits and
burdens of her Islamic marriage. The functional approach has the
advantage of taking an internal vantage point on cultural practices
and investigating their contours, rather than focusing on their
difference and lack of familiarity. This type of analysis invites
resistance to the imposition of majoritarian norms.
Part II will continue my examination of the dangers inherent
in applying the dominant society’s values to a cultural minority’s
traditions. In this case study of Islamic temporary marriage or
muta, law constructs and reinforces notions of the “normal
family.”71
II. Y.J. V. N.J.: THE BEST INTERESTS OF WHOSE CHILD?
White norms prevail, but in an unspoken form. Instead,
they are characterized as positive social norms thereby
legitimising hegemony.72
The “best interests of the child” is the standard for awarding

70

See al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 28
(describing “two basic Islamic legal concepts[:] a married Muslim woman is
legally entitled to her financial independence [and] the husband is obligated to
support his wife.”). There will be some components of Islamic law that courts
are reluctant to enforce based on public policy concerns. See Amin v.
Bakhaty, 798 So. 2d 75, 83-85 (La. 2001) (reviewing American cases that
have refused on public policy grounds to recognize Islamic family law rulings
on child custody).
71
For elaboration of this concept, see Lori G. Beaman, Sexual
Orientation and Legal Discourse: Legal Constructions of the “Normal”
Family, 14 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 173 (1999).
72
Carlos Villarreal, Culture in Lawmaking: A Chicago Perspective, 24
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1193, 1222 (1991).
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custody in Canada73 and the United States. In an attempt to repair
the world of children in custody determinations, courts have
judicial discretion to predict and to determine what would be the
best possible arrangement for a child. Yet because of the broad
discretion inherent in the standard, the very use of the best
interests test sometimes produces results that ignore notions of
identity, religion, belonging, and group affiliation. These
incomplete decisions beg the question of whose perspective is
taken when we attempt to ascertain the best interests to be
served.
Y.J. v. N.J.74 was a Canadian decision determining the
custody of S, a five-year old Muslim girl. The case demonstrates
the problems inherent in the deployment of the purportedly
objective best interests test. By insisting on the stability of the
custodial family, the court refused to engage the unusual
circumstances that gave rise to the dispute: the fact that a
Canadian child was born as the result of a Muslim man’s
simultaneous second marriage. By emphasizing the best interests
of the child without giving sufficient attention to the religious and
cultural context in which she was born, the Ontario Court of
Justice failed to incorporate significant elements in determining
the “harm” at issue.
A. Muta: Her Story
Y.J. (“Y”) was born in Uganda and came to Canada when
she was five years old.75 She was raised in the Shia Muslim
tradition in Edmonton, Alberta.76 In 1985, when she was
eighteen, she fell in love with N.J. (“N”), who was then thirtyfive years old and had been married to S.J. since 1979.77 N, also

73

See Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 24 (1990)
(Can.).
74
(1994) O.J. No. 2359.
75
Id. at ¶ 3.
76
Id.
77
Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3.
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a Shia Muslim, was born in Zaire and came to Canada in 1974.78
He and Y entered into several temporary marriages, called muta79
in the Islamic law recognized by the Shia tradition.80 During this
time they lived and traveled together.81 S.J. was aware of her
husband’s first temporary marriage to Y in 1985.82 At the time of
the second temporary marriage in 1988, while Y was pregnant
with their child, N put an end to the muta.83 Within two weeks of
S’s birth, Y was ordered out of her uncle’s home because she had
disgraced her relatives.84 This was the first time that a child had
been born of a temporary marriage into Y’s family.85
On July 21, 1989, Y signed an agreement transferring
custody of S to her father, and on July 24, 1989, Mr. Justice
Roslak in the Court of Queens Bench of Alberta issued an order
granting N exclusive custody of the child.86 Y and N, however,
had entered into a secret collateral oral agreement, providing that
he would have custody of S for a period of only three years and
that S would then be returned to her mother.87 In his testimony,
N acknowledged this arrangement.88 Meanwhile, S became part
of N’s family and was raised as one of their own.89 She was
unaware that S.J. was not her biological mother or that N’s other
children were her half brothers.90 Even though Y did not see her

78

Id. at ¶ 11.
Muta is a Shia institution of temporary marriage allowing a Muslim
man to marry a woman for a fixed term. Sunni Muslims consider muta to be
irregular. The essential characteristics of the muta marriage are specification
of a dower and a finite term of cohabitation. The husband retains the option to
cancel at any time by “making a gift of the term.” See Murata, supra note 10.
80
Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 2.
81
Id. at ¶ 3
82
Id. at ¶ 13.
83
Id. at ¶ 3.
84
Id. at ¶ 5.
85
Id.
86
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 17.
87
Id. at ¶ 6.
88
Id. at ¶ 7.
89
Id. at ¶¶ 1, 7.
90
Id. at ¶ 1.
79
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daughter during this time, she obtained a private mailbox and N
forwarded her video and audio tapes of S.91 Also, when his wife
was not at home, he would let Y talk to S on the telephone as if
she were her aunt.92
On June 3, 1993, Y obtained an ex parte order in the Court
of Queens Bench of Alberta granting her reasonable access to S
subject to a trial in the province of Ontario.93 In the late summer
of 1993, she came to Toronto and entered into a third temporary
marriage with N.94 She also requested a visit with her daughter,
but when N, with S.J. present in the next room, told her that it
was only possible for one day, she protested.95 Because N and
S.J. threatened to take the child to Tanzania, their home country,
Y brought an application for custody under the Children’s Law
Reform Act96 on September 20, 1993.97 In her testimony, Y
specified that she was only asking for access to S as her
biological mother and did not want to interfere with N and S.J.’s
parenting.98 If she were to claim custody, it would be because N
and S.J. wanted to take S to Africa, circumstances under which
Y would perhaps never see her daughter again.99
In the fall of 1993, consideration was given to returning S to
her mother.100 The respondents arranged for S.J., her sister and S
to visit Edmonton for this purpose.101 During their stay, Y visited
with S on seven to nine different occasions, some in S.J.’s
presence, others not. Y stated that S had no hesitation in going
with her and enjoyed her visits, particularly the five hours she
was with her while they watched a New Year’s parade.102 S.J.,
91

Id. at ¶ 7.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at ¶ 8.
95
Id.
96
R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 24 (1990) (Can.).
97
Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 8.
98
Id. at ¶ 10.
99
Id.
100
Id. at ¶ 9.
101
Id.
102
Id.
92
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according to Y’s testimony, was very hostile towards her and told
her that sharing S was not an option.103 S.J. announced that either
Y could take S or else she and N would return to Africa with
S.104 The custodial transfer never took place since N testified that
he and his wife could not part with S.105
On July 11, 1994, the Ontario Court of Justice dismissed Y’s
application for custody. It held that the respondents were very
competent parents and that any intrusion, particularly the
introduction of access into a stable family, would create a
potential for harm to S.106 In the official text of the decision, the
court stated that the situation at bar was rarely encountered in
custody and access cases because Y and S had not developed any
relationship.107 The subtext, however, has a different flavor. My
following analysis illustrates the underlying assumptions upon
which the Y.J. v. N.J. decision was framed, examined and
resolved. Moreover, I scrutinize legal notions such as “best
interests of the child” and “harm” as they were applied in the
unfamiliar context of a muta marriage.
B. The Best Interests of the Child: The Nuclear Family as
Unstated Norm
Best Interests employs a particular, narrow and static
image of the child.108
Section 24(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act109 requires
that the merits of an application for custody of a child be

103

Id.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at ¶ 14.
107
Id. at ¶ 16.
108
Michael Freeman, Is The Best Interests of the Child in the Best
Interest of the Child?, 11 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 360, 366 (1997).
109
R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 24(1) (1990) (Can.). “The merits of an
application under this Part in respect of custody of or access to a child shall be
determined on the basis of the best interests of the child.” Id.
104
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determined on the basis of the best interests of the child. In a
given case, a court analyzes what best promotes the integrity of
the child and what constitutes harm for the purposes of limiting
or denying custody or access. In so doing, the court considers all
the child’s needs and circumstances according to Section 24(2) of
the Children’s Law Reform Act,110 including such matters as
blood relationships, stability of the family unit, parental abilities,
and the child’s views. The approach is one of case-by-case
decision-making, which has the advantage of acknowledging the
uniqueness of each child,111 but has the disadvantage of being
110

Id. at § 24(2):
In determining the best interests of a child for the purposes of an
application under this Part in respect of custody of or access to a
child, a court shall consider all the needs and circumstances of the
child including,
(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and,
(i) each person entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the
child,
(ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the
child, and
(iii) persons involved in the care and upbringing of the child;
(b) the views and preferences of the child, where such views and
preferences can reasonably be ascertained;
(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home
environment;
(d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of
the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the
necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;
(e) any plans proposed for the care and upbringing of the child;
(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is
proposed that the child will live; and
(g) the relationship by blood or through an adoption order between
the child and each person who is a party to the application.

Id.
111

In the Supreme Court of Canada’s Young v. Young decision, [1993] 4
S.C.R. 3, 117, Madam Justice McLachlin (now Chief Justice) stated:
It has been left to the judge to decide what is in the “best interests of
the child,” by reference to the “condition, means, needs and other
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vague:
Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less
ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself. Should
the judge be primarily concerned with the child’s
happiness? Or with the child’s spiritual and religious
training? Should the judge be concerned with the
economic productivity of the child when he [or she] grows
up? Are the primary values of life in warm, interpersonal
relationships, or in discipline and self-sacrifice? Is
stability and security for a child more desirable than
intellectual stimulation? These questions could be
elaborated endlessly. And yet, where is the judge to look
for the set of values that should inform the choice of what
is best for the child?112
While in theory the best interests test offers flexibility to
include a child’s cultural and religious background, its
application in judicial decisions reflects and perpetuates
stereotypes of the “normal” family. Moreover, the indeterminate
nature of the best interests standard has been criticized for hiding
more than it reveals. Judges have so much discretion that they
make decisions based on personal biases and unsupported
assumptions, thereby imposing mainstream cultural norms and
values that may be inconsistent with those of a minority group.113

circumstances” of the child. Nevertheless, the judicial task is not one
of pure discretion. By embodying the “best interests” test in
legislation and by setting out general factors to be considered,
Parliament has established a legal test, albeit a flexible one. Like all
legal tests, it is to be applied according to the evidence in the case,
viewed objectively. There is no room for the judge’s personal
predilections and prejudices. The judge’s duty is to apply the law. He
or she must not do what he or she wants to do but what she or he
ought to do.
Id.
112

Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in
the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 260 (1975).
113
For a discussion of the best interests of the child principle, see
Nicholas Bala, The Best Interests of the Child in the Post-Modern Era: A
Central but Paradoxical Concept, 6(2) SUP. CT. L. REV. 453 (1995);
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John T. Syrtash has pointedly asked:
Is the protean nature of the “best interest of the child” test
an invitation for racism or is its vagueness a good thing, a
means to invite creative responses to intractable cultural
conflicts? Most importantly, to what extent does a judge
impose his [or her] own cultural values when assessing
the best interest of a child in any custody or child
protection proceeding that appears before him [or her]?114
A survey of jurisprudence by Nicholas Bala and Susan Miklas
revealed that the biases and values of individual judges play a
crucial role in determining the “best interests of the child” in
custody and access disputes.115 As Nicholas Bala remarks:
Even if reliable prediction were possible, the outcome
chosen inevitably is a reflection of the personal values,
judgements and biases of decision makers, and of the
social class, culture, and institution of which they are
members. Given the absence of professional and societal
consensus on what is “best” for a particular child, best
interests means ultimately accepting the decision-maker’s
personal philosophy, beliefs, and opinions about children,
families and child rearing.116
Further, other scholars argue that this test has been implemented
in a discriminatory fashion; individuals who depart from a white,
middle-class, heterosexual normative model have been treated as
Freeman, supra note 108; Mnookin, supra note 112; Bernd Walter et al.,
“Best Interests” in Child Protection Proceedings: Implications and
Alternatives, 12 CAN. J. FAM. L. 367 (1995). For a critique of the
appropriateness of the test, see Karen M. Munro, The Incapability of Rights
Analysis in Post-Divorce Child Custody Decision Making, 30 ALTA. L. REV.
852 (1992); Stephen J. Toope, Riding the Fences: Courts, Charter of Rights
and Family Law, 9 CAN. J. FAM. L. 55, 67 (1991).
114
JOHN T. SYRTASH, RELIGION AND CULTURE IN CANADIAN FAMILY
LAW 2-3 (Butterworths, 1992).
115
Nicholas Bala & Susan Miklas, Re-thinking Decisions about Children:
Is the “Best Interests” of the Child Approach Really in the Best Interests of
Children?, Paper presented at the National Family Law Program in
Charlottetown, Canada, June 5, 1992.
116
Walter et al., supra note 113, at 380.
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“deviant” by legal decision-makers.117
Y.J. v. N.J. perpetuates notions of the “normal” family that
have become legitimized through biased legal discourse. In
resolving the application for custody, the Ontario Court of Justice
relied entirely on an assessment report, prepared pursuant to
Section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act,118 by Dr. Graham
Berman, a child psychiatrist at the Hospital for Sick Children in
Toronto.119 In his decision, the judge chose to rely on some
aspects of the assessment report rather than others. The chosen
excerpts defined and constructed notions of normalcy and the
child’s best interests.120 In these excerpts, Dr. Berman did not
take into account or even mention that he was describing a
Muslim girl born in the particular context of an extended
family.121 The significance of cultural and religious differences

117

See Katherine Arnup, Mothers Just Like Others: Lesbians, Divorce
and Child Custody in Canada, 3(1) CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 18 (1989); Marlee
Kline, Child Welfare Law, “Best Interests of the Child” Ideology and First
Nations, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 375 (1992); Marlee Kline, Complicating the
Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nation Women, 18
QUEEN’S L.J. 306 (1993); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The
Best Interests Test and the Costs of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-91).
One jurist came to the conclusion that the application of the best interests of
the child test has led to the cultural genocide of Manitoba’s aboriginal
population. See Associate Chief Judge E.C. Kimelman, No Quiet Place,
Report of the Review Committee on Indian and Metis Adoptions and
Placements, Manitoba Community Service (1985).
118
Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 30(1) (1990) (Can.)
(stating that “[th]e court before which an application is brought in respect to
custody of or access to a child, by order, may appoint a person who has
technical or professional skill to assess and report to the court on the needs of
the child and the ability and willingness of the parties or any of them to satisfy
the needs of the child”).
119
Y.J. v. N.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 14.
120
Id. (praising the custodial family as providing the “love and support of
parents and brothers”). Drawing on the work of Carol Smart, Professor
Beaman has noted: “Experts construct notions of the normal, and medical and
‘psy’ discourses work to cure the abnormal. Law colludes with these
discourses through the use of expert testimony.” Beaman, supra note 71, at
180.
121
See Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 14.
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was not addressed. The best interests of the child were identified
using a partial, limited lens, one suited to a gaze that illuminates
some aspects of the picture while obscuring others. Only part of
S’s history was told.
Underpinned by the idea that the nuclear family is the only
normative value system, Dr. Berman stated that “[p]reservation
of the continuity of this family and its successful function must be
the first consideration in supporting the child’s interests.”122 The
family in the Canadian and American collective and selective
imagination is defined as the nuclear family, which is deemed a
site of stability, happiness, love, and support.123 “[I]ts power,”
Susan Boyd has argued, “has been, and is, very strong as a
model held up to us as ideal.”124 The mythical image of the
nuclear family was so strong in Y.J. v. N.J. that it went
unmentioned—it was assumed as the unstated norm. And the
norm is found unequivocally to serve the best interests of the
Muslim girl, even though this specific child was not born in the
traditional family model accepted in Canadian society and law.125
122

Id.
For a feminist analysis of the dominant image of the heterosexual,
middle class “nuclear family” in modern western societies, see MICHÈLE
BARRETT & MARY MCINTOSH, THE ANTI-SOCIAL FAMILY (Verso 1982);
Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Law, Gender and Ideology, in LEGAL THEORY MEETS
LEGAL PRACTICE (A. Bayefsky ed., 1988); Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Paradise
Lost, Paradise Revisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist,
Lesbian, and Gay Engagement with Law, 31 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 589 (1993).
For an analysis of the ways in which the law of marriage perpetuates women’s
economic dependence within the family, see CAROL SMART, THE TIES THAT
BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PATRIARCHAL
RELATIONS (Routledge 1984).
124
Susan Boyd, Some Postmodernist Challenges to Feminist Analyses of
Law, Family and State: Ideology and Discourse in Child Custody Law, 10
CAN. J. FAM. L. 79, 91 (1991).
125
Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 12. The court draws a distinction
between “our” conception of marriage and the Islamic conception involved in
the case in the following manner:
Under Islamic law, there are said to be two types of permissive
marriage: The first being a permanent marriage, as exists between the
respondents, which is the legal and traditional marriage recognized in
Canadian society. The second being a temporary marriage. A
123
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In Y.J. v. N.J., the concept of “family” contained an
assumption that there is such a thing as a “true,” “real,”
“normal” model of relationships, namely the nuclear family,
rendering marginal or deviant any other family model. Thus, the
importance of “the continuity of this family” in Dr. Berman’s
report became crucial and self-evident as a reference to the
“natural/normal” way of bringing up children.126 The young,
single biological mother who is a temporary wife has no role to
fulfill. In the eyes of the court, Y’s intrusion would have led to
the stepmother’s hostility and would have caused familial
instability: “The emotional meaning of such an intrusion for Mrs.
J. and, perhaps, the risk to the family should there be a
resurgence of the relationship between Mr. J. and Ms. J. would
put the welfare of S. at risk.”127
The court’s message is that, in spite of the different context,
or indeed because of it, the construction of the family and the
determination of the best interests of the child shall remain
universal. The decision in Y.J. v. N.J. represents the power of
law to ignore differences and to render invisible the cultural
Other. By characterizing the custody and access issue in a
manner that minimizes the nature of the extended and bigamous
family, the court’s legal method maintained, operationalized, and
serviced order. The intersection of law with purportedly objective
knowledge that produces Western views of the family, denies
autonomy to Muslim people in general and to Muslim women in
particular, whose experiences and perspectives on the notion of
family may differ.

temporary marriage or Mutah [sic] is an oral agreement time limited
and resolvable on such terms as the parties thereto themselves decide
upon.
Id. (emphasis added).
126
Id. at ¶ 14.
127
Id.
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C. Denial of Access Under Special Circumstances: The
Muslim Mother as a Sexual Threat
Il y a nulle parité entre les deux sexes quant à la
consé quence du sexe. Le mâle n’est mâle qu’en certains
instants, la femelle est femelle toute sa vie ou du moins
toute sa jeunesse; tout la rappelle sans cesse à son sexe.128

The court’s reasoning behind its conclusion that the biological
mother in Y.J. v. N.J. should be denied access to her daughter
belies the true basis of its holding. Generally, it is assumed that
access129 to the non-custodial parent is in the best interests of the
child. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, “[a] child
should be with someone who fosters the relationship between him
or her and the non-custodial parent.”130 Access gives the child an
opportunity to maintain or establish a full and meaningful
relationship with both parents, so the rule is to allow access
unless there is evidence of harm or absolutely no benefit from
contact.
Increasingly, courts are willing to reintroduce a parent into a
child’s life after an extended absence if the parent has a genuine
desire for a relationship with the child.131 Lack of contact, in
itself, is not a reason to deny access unless evidence shows that
the parent would have a bad influence on the child or that he or
she repudiated the relationship with the child.132 Yet the Ontario
Court of Justice in Y.J. v. N.J. did not even state S’s right to
develop a relationship with her biological mother, who had a
genuine desire to contribute to the child’s well-being. Rather, the
128

This quote, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile, ou l’education
(1762), book 5, translates into English as follows: “There is no parity between
the two sexes as to the consequence of sex. The male is only male in certain
instances; the female is female all her life or at least all her youth; everything
constantly reminds her of her sex.”
129
Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 20 (1990) (Can.)
(defining access as the right to visit with and be visited by the children).
130
Van de Perre v. Edwards, [2001] S.C.C. 60, at ¶ 23.
131
See F.(S.M.) v. M.(J.), [1997] W.D.F.L. 760 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
132
See Keeping v. Pacey, [1996] W.D.F.L. 896 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
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court said that because the child did not know her biological
mother, no access should be granted:
Most of the authorities counsel cited to me were cases
where the child knows and has an established relationship
with each parent. The court then is required to weigh and
balance the competing factors or, if you will, choose
between the lesser of two evils or the least detrimental of
two alternatives. That is not the situation here where the
child does not know and has no relationship whatsoever
with her biological mother and where the granting of any
access creates a real risk for the child.133
The judge failed to mention, however, that S had already
been introduced to her biological mother on seven to nine
different occasions, and that, according to Y’s testimony, S
highly enjoyed the time they spent together.134 In the assessment
quoted by the court, Dr. Berman acknowledged how terrible it
would be for Y to have no access to her daughter: “Under most
circumstances I would consider it reasonable to introduce a
relationship with the birth mother since S’s secure attachment and
emotional resilience could easily accommodate it. Not to have
such a relationship would also represent a tragic loss for Ms. J.,
who certainly deserves sympathetic consideration.”135 But for Dr.
Berman, denial of access was justifiable on the basis of
unreasonable special circumstances:
There are, however, special circumstances which compel
much caution in this case. First, the emotional security of
the custodial family may be jeopardized by the presence
in their lives of Ms. J. And secondly, to mandate a
relationship which would interfere with the migration
plans of the J. family would represent a potentially
destructive impingement on their autonomy.
The emotional meaning of such an intrusion for Mrs. J.
and, perhaps, the risk to the family should there be a

133
134
135

Y.J. v. N.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 14.
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resurgence of the relationship between Mr. J. and Ms. J.
would put the welfare of S. at risk. On the other hand, to
require a relationship between Ms. J. and S., while it
would be the humane decision for Ms. J., would not bring
any easily predictable benefit for S., notwithstanding the
goodwill and excellent personal characteristics of Ms. J.,
it would be putting S. at risk in the interests of Ms. J.136
Adopting these findings, the court ruled on the basis of
Islamic difference. Justice Walsh underscored in his judgment
that “this is not the usual situation encountered in most custody
and access cases of separated parents.”137 His underlying
argument appeared to be that a potential resurgence of the
relationship between Y and N would emotionally hurt N’s wife.
Thus, denial of access rested not so much on the best interests of
the child S, but rather on the best interests of S.J. One section of
the decision in particular illustrates this point:
[N] freely admitted that the move to Africa would result
in an ocean being placed between the applicant and S. but
felt this would maintain the stability of his family by
giving his wife peace of mind by knowing that the
applicant, whose presence in their lives highly disturbs
her, was a continent away.
She does not feel that the applicant should have access to
S. as there is no goodwill or good faith left between them
and this would cause confusion and problems for all three
children and jeopardize the stability of their family which
is presently very healthy and robust. She also feels access
may well result in a resumption of the relationship
between her husband and the applicant. With good cause,
she trusts neither her husband nor the applicant in this
regard.138
One is struck by the ways in which the court portrayed the
Muslim biological mother. She is assumed to be a sexual

136
137
138

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at ¶ 15.
Id. at ¶¶ 12-13 (emphasis added).
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temptation putting the stability of the custodial family at risk.
Instead of focusing on the man, who made the offers of three
temporary Islamic marriages, the court presupposed that if Y
were to develop a relationship with her daughter, Y’s mere
presence would lure and irresistibly attract N. By denying the
mother-child bond, the stability of the custodial family is
ensured. In other words, once she is out, their world is saved.
The judge chose not to emphasize that N, as Y’s Sunday
school teacher, was the one who initiated their relationship. He
told his student that he was unhappy in his marriage and was
getting divorced. He showed her books on muta and presented
the institution as a form of dating within an Islamic framework.
He entered into the first temporary marriage in 1985, when he
was thirty-five years old and Y was eighteen years old.139 He
contracted his second temporary marriage three years later, and
ended it while Y was pregnant.140 As to the third temporary
marriage, it occurred in the summer of 1993 when Y came to
Toronto and asked to visit her daughter.141
In Y.J. v. N.J., the court held that no order for access should
be made because the introduction of her biological mother would
create a potential for harm to S’s best interests.142 Yet, inspection
of the judge’s reasoning reveals his true unstated anxiety: that the
Muslim woman would sexually threaten the rightful wife and tear
apart the custodial family. The decision is questionable even in
traditional legal terms since the prominence it gives to S.J.’s
concerns about her husband’s sexual discipline is excessive. As
stated subsequently by the Supreme Court of Canada in a less
“unusual” case involving an extramarital affair, “[a] trial judge
cannot give custody to a father merely because his wife is a good
mother. Her presence is a factor but, overall, the court must
consider if the applicant would make a good father in her
139

Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
141
Id. at ¶ 8. For a presentation of the facts from Y’s point of view, see
Shahnaz Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism: Muta and the Canadian Legal
System, 8 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 249, 254 (1995) [hereinafter Khan, Race,
Gender, and Orientalism].
142
Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 17.
140
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absence.”143 N was not adequately abstracted from his family.
The error is all the more egregious when applied to an issue of
access, which can always be supervised to minimize conflict.
More fundamentally, the faulty legal approach that denied Y
all contact with her child can be traced to the judge’s lack of
appreciation of the cultural context. Instead of avoiding the
significance of Shia Islam, the court should have explored the
meaning of this religion for all parties to the dispute using a
functional rather than an unstated norm-based analysis. Context
must replace subtext. Had the judge brought a functional
approach to bear on the matter, S’s best interests would not have
been defined to exclude time with her mother. Y was punished
for participating in a cultural practice that empowers men, but
not women, to have sexual relationships outside their primary
marriage.
The judge could have taken an internal perspective on the
institution of muta and achieved a more nuanced understanding of
a relationship far more complex than Western “adultery.” The
“traditional” concept of infidelity is not applicable, nor is
“normal” monogamy.144 For one thing, as the court noted,
children born out of a muta marriage are considered legitimate in
Shia Islamic law. This indicates that different considerations
should apply to ascribing responsibility for the tension that results
between principal and temporary wives. The court’s ruling goes
against the best interests of S by depriving her of a relationship
with her mother in order to protect her father. The real harm it
addresses is not prospective resumption of N’s offers to Y of
muta marriage (propositions that could still happen with other
women), but rather the existence of the dangerous liaison in the
first place. It should never have happened. The judge negates Y’s
personhood by obliterating her presence in S’s life and by
143

Van de Perre v. Edwards, [2001] S.C.C. 60, at ¶ 30.
I note that polygamy is exceptional within the Islamic faith: “[I]n
Muslim countries the vast majority of marriages are monogamous.” See
Patrick Parkinson, Taking Multiculturalism Seriously: Marriage Law and the
Rights of Minorities, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 473, 497 (1994) (quoting a
submission by the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils to the Australian
Law Reform Commission).
144
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substituting the illusion of a normal family. The little girl will
never know her difference.
D. Protection Against Harm: What is Harm Anyway?
The issue of racism is fundamentally about the power of
the mass and the shared belief system; the power to shape
reality in accordance with one’s values; the power to give
voice to or to silence the diversity of others. . . . Judges
must be certain that their ethnocentrism is not the filter
being used to evaluate another community’s cultural
norm.145
In the preceding section, I challenged the court’s depiction of
the potential harm to S. Harm as a legal notion in family law
deserves further scrutiny. Is the potential harm derived from S’s
birth into a different and unfamiliar culturally-defined
community? Should the harm-based best interests test be adapted
to the particular context of an extended family?
According to the best interests test, the well-being of children
is assured by the absence of harm. The best interests test does not
define what “harm” means. It merely suggests that “harm” is
opposed to the best interests of the child. Shauna Van Praagh has
written that it “is evident . . . that ‘best interests’ and ‘harm’ are
both terms with open-ended definitions and, further, that they
operate as sides of the same coin, both used to justify a judge’s
decision as to the scope of the custody and access.”146 Again,
ideological assumptions concerning what is best for children, and
in this case who the better mother is, are bound up in idealized
family models. Susan Boyd reminds us that “[m]others who
depart from the norm—whether sexually or in terms of work or
lifestyle—often have trouble persuading the judge that it is in the

145

Joanne St. Lewis, Racism in the Judicial Decision-making Process, in
8:2 CURRENT READINGS IN RACE RELATIONS 15, 17 (1994).
146
Shauna Van Praagh, Religion, Custody, and a Child’s Identities, 35
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 309, 335 (1997).
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best interests of their children to be with them.”147 In Y.J. v.
N.J., refusal to grant Y any visitation rights was based on the
harm associated with her presence within a so-called stable
family, but the court was vague about what harms Y would
cause. Justice Walsh’s analysis went as follows: “The J.’s are
very competent parents and any intrusion, particularly, such as
the introduction of access into their well-functioning family,
creates a potential for harm to S. which otherwise does not
exist.”148
As in Kaddoura v. Hammoud,149 the characterization of issues
in Y.J. v. N.J.150 was embedded in numerous underlying but
unstated assumptions. Even though he did not incorporate
religious evidence, Justice Walsh nevertheless attempted to
examine the legitimacy of children born during a muta marriage:
While any children born out of temporary marriages are
not considered illegitimate by Islamic law, the evidence of
S.K. would indicate that such marriages are not looked
upon with favor within the Moslem community generally
and there is often a stigma attached to such marriages and
the children of such marriages.151
He invoked stigma based on testimony by an expert witness,
Canadian sociologist Shahnaz Khan.152
To what extent did the notion of social stigma for S influence
the denial of custody and access to the biological mother? And
was the stigma really one imposed by the “Muslim community”
or one translated from the majoritarian definition of legitimacy?
Tellingly, Khan struck a very different note when later critiquing
the case for its Orientalist assumptions:

147

Susan Boyd, Employed Mothers, Lifestyles, and Child Custody Law, in
CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 265 (Susan Boyd, ed., 1998).
148
Y.J. v. N.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 17.
149
[1998] D.L.R. (4th) 503.
150
(1994) O.J. No. 2359.
151
Id. at ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
152
For concerns about the role of expert witnesses in the context of
culturally-based legal disputes, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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Normative Canadian traditions contain Orientalist stereotypes about the Muslim community as “Other” and as
homogeneous. In making his decision based on the
likelihood of Y.J.’s ostracism from the community, it
appears the judge wished to secure a place for S. within a
single-visioned Muslim community. In a sense, this notion
of community, a creation of racist stereotypes, was that of
an unchanging community with no internal contradictions
and challenges.153
In referring to a potential social stigma imposed by the
“Muslim community” on both the biological mother and the
child, but not on the father, for having been involved in an
Islamic temporary marriage, the judge equates cultural difference
with harm. Muta becomes the decisive factor. Vague evidence154
about Muslim people’s beliefs supported the denial of custody
and access as a way of rendering S “normal,” that is, “not
stigmatized.” In other words, the best interests of the child could
only be secured by silencing the role of the muta in the lives of Y

153

Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism, supra note 141, at 259; see
also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
154
Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism, supra note 141, at 258. Khan
mentions that the Court did not let her comment on the issue of the applicant’s
access to her child:
As a Muslim social scientist, I do not draw my expertise from a
religious base alone, nor do I fit the stereotypes of one who adheres
to religious prescriptions. In allowing me to testify the judge, I
assume, was trying to be culturally sensitive. Yet despite my
qualifications and experience in psychological assessment, he did not
allow me to comment on the main issue, [Y]’s access to the child.
Instead, he marginalized my comments to the cultural aspect or the
topic of Muta. It is significant that when [Y]’s lawyers approached
me they wanted me to do an assessment. But it was clear from their
comments that they wanted a woman who would talk about the
sexism of Muslim culture/religion and how it continues to oppress
women. I countered that to take such a position would lead to more
racism against Muslims and would provide only a partial picture,
which would leave out the devaluation and marginalization of
Muslims within Canadian society.
Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism, supra note 141, at 259.
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and her daughter. Khan points out that such reasoning is
misguided:
The judge and others within the Canadian legal system
involved in this case did not understand muta and it
appears that they did not wish to do so either. The
implications of muta in [Y]’s case were largely ignored
and the dispute was treated as if muta had not occurred
and did not exist. Thus for [Y] her dispute became a
multi-sided struggle—not only against community and
family pressures, but also against the ethnocentrism of a
legal system that considered the institution of muta and its
implications to be inconsequential.155
I partly disagree, since in my view muta was supremely
consequential in this case. Without it the judge could not have
used his notion of stigma to define potential harm to S.
Mainstream “illegitimacy” arising out of an extramarital affair
would not have been legally acceptable as a bar to maternal
access. As the legal anthropologist Max Gluckman observed,
“[legal] [c]oncepts are absorbent in that they can draw into
themselves a variety of raw facts of very different kind. They are
also permeable, in the sense that they are at any one time
permeated by certain principles, presumptions, prejudices and
postulates, which the judges hold to be beyond question.”156
A powerful myth of law is that it stands outside the social
context and operates in a neutral, universal, and objective
manner. We can no longer negatively compare minority groups’
religious beliefs and behaviors to the “norm” of mainstream
society without stating and questioning the content of this norm.
Once we disrupt assumptions embedded in legal discourse, we
can escape the constriction of norms. Judges will then be free to
multiply the frames of reference and perspectives through which
legal method is constructed and applied.
In Y.J. v. N.J., production of legal knowledge about the
racialized Other was inscribed within a specific majoritarian
155

Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism, supra note 141, at 257.
MAX GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 24 (1965),
quoted in Riles, supra note 66, at 639.
156
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milieu. The decision was based on unstated norms shared by
dominant society, making assertions of universality little more
than a mirage. Throughout the judgment, the Muslim woman Y
was depicted as abnormal because of her difference. She
symbolized muta, polygamy, and instability. In the Othering
process, the court polarized her position from that of the
opposing parties. They, although Muslims, were portrayed as
having assimilated into the mainstream of Canadian society, as
part of a monogamous, stable, and nuclear family. Marked as the
Other, Y was pushed out of the prevalent notion of “what is a
family.” When the universalization of the dominant group’s
experience and perspective is established as the norm, as in this
case, whoever falls outside its borders risks losing her claim by
definition. As long as this norm is not stated and challenged, the
active marginalization and disempowerment of minority people
will remain invisible yet pervasive.
E. Muta in California: The Objective Fallacy Allows Bad
Faith to Triumph
As with the Mahr, the courts of the United States have also
confronted the institution of muta. An appellate court in
California adopted a universalist approach in its 1988 decision, In
re Vryonis.157 The appellant, Speros Vryonis, a non-practicing
member of the Greek Orthodox Church, was the director of the
Center for Near Eastern Studies at the University of California,
Los Angeles.158 The respondent, Fereshteh Vryonis, a Shia
Muslim and a citizen of Iran, met Speros when she was a visiting
professor at the Center in 1979.159 In 1982, the couple began to
date, but Fereshteh repeatedly expressed her concern that under
the tenets of her religion she needed marriage or commitment in
order to see Speros.160 On March 17, 1982, she conducted a
private marriage ceremony for the two of them that conformed to
157
158
159
160

248 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 809.
Id.
Id.
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the requirements of muta.161 According to the court, “Fereshteh
was unfamiliar with the requirements of American or California
marriage law. However, she believed the ceremony created a
valid and binding marriage, and Speros so assured her.”162 The
court noted that the relationship was kept secret, that all “usual
indicia” of marriage were lacking,163 and that the bond
subsequently deteriorated to the point that the couple spent no
nights together in 1984.
In July of that year, Speros, who had not stopped dating other
women, informed Fereshteh that he was going to marry someone
else, which he did in September.164 As a result, Fereshteh began
telling others about the marriage ceremony she had performed
two years earlier, and, in October 1984, she went to court
seeking spousal support and a determination of property rights.165
The trial court found in Fereshteh’s favor under the “putative
spouse doctrine,” “based upon the reasonable expectations of the
parties to an alleged marriage entered into in good faith.”166
This judgment was overturned on appeal because Fereshteh’s
belief was held to be objectively unreasonable.167 The appellate
court effectively defined Fereshteh’s perspective as too
irrational—too Oriental—for Western legal relief to be granted:
161

Id.
Id. The court added: “On frequent occasions, Fereshteh requested
Speros to solemnize their marriage in a mosque or other religious setting,
which Speros refused.” Id.
163
The couple “did not cohabit, or hold themselves out as husband and
wife, and in no way approximated the conduct of a married couple.” Id. at
814. Azizah al-Hibri points out that some putatively objective indicia of
Western marriage are in fact based on assumptions incompatible with Islamic
marriages. For example, the concepts of merged bank accounts and a common
surname, mentioned by the court to be lacking in Vryonis, are opposed to
widespread Muslim practice. See Azizah al-Hibri, Issues Regarding Family
Law Affecting American Muslims, Paper presented to the NGO Forum, United
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Huairou, China, Sept. 7, 1995,
available at http://www.zawaj.com/articles/challenges_women_4.html.
164
Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
165
Id. at 809-10.
166
Id. at 810.
167
Id. at 813-14.
162
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Because the parties made no colorable attempt at
compliance [with the procedural requirements], Fereshteh
could not reasonably believe a valid California marriage
came into being. Fereshteh’s ignorance of the law does
not compel a contrary conclusion. Further, her reliance
on Speros’s assurances is unavailing.168
The court, making no attempt to dispel its own ignorance of
the Islamic law of muta, reified a majoritarian legal category, as
did the courts in the Mahr cases that evaluated claims based on
contract or prenuptial agreement principles. Its simple holding
was that “[a] belief [that] one’s marriage conforms to the
precepts of one’s faith is insufficient to come within the [putative
spouse] doctrine.”169 Because “the facts were at odds with the
formation and existence of a valid marriage pursuant to
California law, Fereshteh could not reasonably rely on Speros’s
statements to believe she was married. Notwithstanding
Fereshteh’s sincerity, her belief was unreasonable and therefore
not in good faith.”170 The irony of the court’s dual use of the
word “faith” to represent both Fereshteh’s religion and her belief
in marriage is striking, since the judgment essentially ruled that
her Islamic beliefs were “not in good faith.” This implies an
unstated norm that the Muslim faith is not a “good” or accepted
one.
The universality and neutrality of the law has no patience for
“unsolemnized, unlicensed and unrecorded” marriages,
regardless of the relative equities presented by the parties.
Although Speros lied in bad faith, he was saved by the dominant
faith, the secular religion of California law and majoritarian
society, which trumped Fereshteh’s quaint, but patently foreign
“sincerity.”171 Her claim was not only rejected, but also belittled

168

Id. at 813.
Id. at 815. For the analogous Mahr decisions, see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
170
Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
171
This brings to mind the Mahr case of Kaddoura v. Hammoud, [1999]
168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Gen. Div.), in which the court found the husband’s actions “somewhat offensive and dishonourable.” See supra note 46.
169
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as being objectively unreasonable and irrational. Again, the legal
process silences the Muslim woman, with no functional effort
made by the court to appreciate her perspective and that of her
cultural community.
CONCLUSION
The cases discussed in this article reveal the process of
constructing Muslim identity in Canadian and American
courtrooms and the resulting connotations of Islam in the judicial
arena. Judges have used majoritarian values to interpret the
family law issues at stake, thereby projecting the dominant
society’s experience onto all communities’ members. When
claims to universality go unchallenged, minority people’s cultures
are measured against unstated norms and become the abnormal,
the Other.
Kaddoura v. Hammoud demonstrates how cultural anxiety
operates to exclude those perceived as different. Selected people
are identified with the power to make enforceable contracts; the
Others are not. Universalist reasoning produces an exclusionary
result. Muslim culture is treated as an outsider whose specific
traditions are translated into Otherness. Careful reading of Y.J. v.
N.J. similarly makes this process apparent. In the eyes of the
court, N.J., his wife, and their children form a family that is
“natural and normal” as defined through the lens of Canadian
identity. Although Muslim, they are almost “Canadian,” but Y.J.
is not. Y.J. is essentialized as a Muslim woman whose child is
the result of a marriage with an already married man. Her
application for custody and access was dismissed because, in
relation to the “normal” family, she was viewed as deviant and
different.
Canadian and American courts operating in our multicultural
societies often face dilemmas like that of Mahr enforcement or
muta assessment.172 Unsophisticated approaches in family law to

172

Other jurisdictions are also confronting these issues. See, for example,
the South African Constitutional Court’s ruling in Amod v. Multilateral Motor
Vehicle Accidents Fund, 1998 (10) SA 753; 1998 (10) BCLR 1207 (CC)
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Muslim differences are deeply troubling. These decisions create a
category of “Others,” whose claims and experiences are denied
and excluded through legal discourse. Legal method is deemed
objective, but universalist and cultural relativist approaches
preserve only the illusion that law produces “truth.”
The coercive power of law resides precisely in its ability to
appear neutral when in reality it shapes society in the mold of
dominant values. Both Canadian and American judicial discourse
are tainted by Orientalism that is at once horrified and fascinated
by Muslim women. The Mahr and muta cases demonstrate the
existence of multicultural challenges to family law, quandaries
for which I have proposed a contextual remedy, the functional
approach. Judges need to become more perspicacious when they
decide culturally complex disputes in this most agonizingly
personal of legal domains.

(considering but not deciding an underlying dispute concerning a claim for loss
of support by a widow married according to Islamic law). Regarding the new
South Africa’s changed attitude toward Muslim marriages, see the concurring
opinion of Justice Sachs in S. v. Solberg, 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC), at ¶
152:
The marginalisation of communities of Hindu and Muslim persuasion
flowed from and reinforced a tendency for the norms of “Christian
civilization” to be regarded as points of departure, and for Hindu and
Muslim norms to be relegated to the space of the deviant “Other.”
Any echo today of the superior status in public law once enjoyed by
Christianity must therefore be understood as a reminder of the
subordinate position to which followers of other faiths were formerly
subjected.
Id.

